The aim of this study was to identify limitations and incentives in reporting clinically suspect 
INTRODUCTION
Outbreaks of notifiable contagious animal diseases (NADs), such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD), avian influenza (AI) and classical swine fever (CSF), have large societal and personal consequences. Livestock farmers and veterinary practitioners are at the frontline of surveillance, and hence it is widely recognized that they play a key role in detecting first occurrences of NADs. In theory, notification of contagious livestock diseases by farmers to the veterinary authorities can be an effective early detection tool. Therefore, formal rules for reporting clinically suspect situations in livestock by farmers and veterinary practitioners are laid down in national and international legislation all over the world. In the Netherlands it all started with the Dutch Cattle Act, which was officially put into force in the year 1870 (Wester, 1939) . It consisted of a list of contagious diseases like rinderpest, anthrax, rabies and FMD. Furthermore, it contained regulations for reporting of affected and suspect livestock to the mayor of the municipality by farmers; obligatory reporting by veterinary practitioners; isolation and prohibition of transport of sick and suspect livestock, etc. In essence, not much has changed with respect to the reporting and eradication process of NADs since those early days. Yet, we cannot conclude that the regulations produce a desired effect, because in spite of strict rules and regulations, experience has shown that the time between the first clinical appearance of a NAD and the actual reporting of farmers of clinically suspect situations to the veterinary authorities is often too long, resulting in extensive spread of the disease to other farms (Capua and Marangon, 2000; CFIA, 2004; Elbers et al. 1999 Elbers et al. , 2004 Gibbens et al., 2001 ).
Investigation of the scarce empirical evidence to date on issues concerning delayed reporting and underreporting of clinically suspect situations shows that the problem thus far has mostly been approached as a veterinary-technical problem (Elbers et al., 2006) . If livestock farmers and veterinary practitioners are familiar with the clinical signs of a NAD, they are in the best Published in Veterinary Microbiology 2010; 142: 108-118 . 4 position to detect NAD suspects. However, often these diseases have not been in the country for many years or sometimes even decades, and farmers and some veterinary practitioners do not recognize the associated clinical signs any more (Elbers et al., 2002) . Furthermore, many endemic animal diseases cause clinical signs similar to NADs. After a considerable period of freedom from NADs in a country, farmers and vets will have a tendency to think that clinical signs observed are caused by an endemic disease and not by a NAD. As a result, farmers fail to recognize the need to report these early clinical signs of NADs, which implies that the time needed for ultimate detection of a new infection would provide time for the disease agent to spread. For instance, many case reports indicated CSF was suspected only after prolonged medication had failed to produce desired results (Young, 1970; Elbers et al. 1999) . Laboratory confirmation would be necessary in order to exclude NADs being the cause of the clinical problems observed. However, laboratory confirmation is in many national regulations only allowed after reporting to the veterinary authorities. Hence, asking for laboratory confirmation may lead to control measures, such as isolation of the farm, until the results of diagnostic testing are available. Moreover, isolation of the farm, especially if this happens for several days, may have negative economic consequences for the farmer.
Only recently, socio-psychological factors have become the focus of interest as possible predictors of delayed reporting of clinically suspect situations by farmers and veterinary practitioners. Results of a qualitative study among Australian sheep farmers on implementing biosecurity measures (Palmer et al., 2007) showed that one of the basic issues that may underlie the problem of not reporting clinically suspect situations to either the local agricultural department office or even a veterinarian may be a low level of trust in the government as well as agricultural extension agents. This lack of trust in government bodies also appeared as an important factor why farmers do not trust government information on improving biosecurity measures (Heffernan et al., 2008) . This lack of trust is based on negative personal experiences with the authorities, such as the way the government had responded to cases of infectious diseases in the past. A study into Norwegian sheep farmers'
showing vigilance in reporting scrapie-associated clinical signs (Hopp et al., 2007) , indicated that reporting was dependent on both economic and non-economic values. Among the economic values considered important by farmers were being offered free examination of NAD suspects. Knowledge of disease-associated clinical signs by farmers and worries about blaming oneself for experiencing the disease ranked high among the non-economic values.
Increasing the reporting rate and shortening the delay time for reporting is crucial, but it is complicated by the fact that little is currently known about the way farmers behave in possible clinically suspect situations, more specifically, their perception and appraisal of the situation, the decision process that follows, and the intentions and behaviors that flow from these perceptions and decisions.
The purpose of our study was to identify limitations and incentives in reporting clinically suspect situations possibly caused by CSF as perceived by veterinary authorities, pig farmers and veterinary practitioners, with the ultimate aim of improving early detection of CSF outbreaks.
METHODS
To learn more about why farmers decide to report or not to report clinically suspect situations of NADs, our study combined a qualitative and a quantitative research design. For the qualitative part of our study, focus group sessions were held with a group of policy makers of the Ministry of Agriculture (4 persons) that were among others responsible for animal health policy and regulation; the Food and Consumer Protection Authority (2 persons from the head office responsible for disease eradication) that is responsible for the actual emergency response when a suspicion is reported or an outbreak is detected; Board members of several livestock sections from the Royal Dutch Veterinary Association (6 persons: livestock practitioners themselves, but with an interest in veterinary policy making) and with Board members of all three pig farmer unions present in the Netherlands (3 persons, also pig farmers themselves) to detect patterns and trends. Subsequently, personal in-depth interviews with 12 pig farmers (randomly selected from a registry of all Dutch pig farmers) and 5 veterinary practitioners (with pig farms in their practice, selected to be more or less representative for different geographical areas within the Netherlands) were held to check if there might be other limitations, solutions and incentives with respect to reporting clinically suspect situations as suggested in the focus group meetings. Most of them had experience with a CSF outbreak in their neighbourhood in the past (not necessarily on their own farm), some had experience with respect to a visit by the veterinary authorities to their farm due to reporting of a suspect clinical situation identified at the slaughterhouse. Based on the results of the qualitative research, an electronic questionnaire was sent via an e-mail newsletter to members of a large pig farmer organization and posted for three weeks on the website of the Royal Dutch Veterinary Association. The questionnaire was subdivided into four sections. Section a) asked when and under what conditions one would report a clinically suspect situation. Section b) asked about feelings and (economic) consequences one expected after reporting a clinical suspicion. These questions were formulated both for the case that, retrospectively, clinical signs would indeed turn out to be caused by CSF (true positive), as well as the situation that in retrospect it would become clear that this was not caused by CSF (false positive). Section c) asked about barriers for reporting; and d) about opinions on national regulation explaining when and how to report a clinically suspect situation. Finally, the questionnaire did not just probe into possible limitations, but also possible solutions to break down the barriers. Published in Veterinary Microbiology 2010; 142: 108-118 .
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A grounded theory approach (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) was used to analyze the content of focus group and in-depth interviews. Each discrete incident, idea, or event was given a name or code word that represented the concept underlying the observation. Coded data were then isolated, reviewed, and interpreted line by line, to form categories and sub-categories until theoretical saturation was assumed (Patton 2002) . Finally, categories and sub-categories were integrated to form substantive themes. Overall, six themes emerged from the data.
With respect to the electronic questionnaire, relative differences in opinions and attitudes between veterinary practitioners and pig farmers were tested with a χ 2 statistic (Statistix, 2000) .
RESULTS

Focus groups
A summary of items indicated as limitations for reporting clinically suspect situations possibly caused by a notifiable pig disease by the veterinary authorities, veterinary practitioners and pig farmers is shown in Table 1 . In Table 2 cases of pigs with early clinical signs of CSF, many farmers responded that they saw these symptoms at least once a week, but did not think it could be caused by CSF. In reality, half of these cases were real life cases of CSF.
Theme 2. Guilt, Shame and Prejudice
Public opinion and social norms were identified by farmers as significantly influencing their practice of biosecurity. Farmers interviewed in our study felt that if they reported, and especially if they would be the first farmer to report, other farmers might think they had done something wrong. This relates to Theme 1, namely many people have erroneous opinions on how diseases spread. A reflection from the focus group meeting: …."Many people would agree that farmers with poor hygiene who have illegal practices run a higher risk to introduce an animal disease on their farm. Hence people who admit they may have an animal disease on the farm are afraid others may think they are unhygienic and have illegal practices". A farmer commented that farmers who are the first to report "should be made heroes in the public opinion instead of criminals." Connected to this theme, many farmers expressed their dissatisfaction with the obtrusive "circus", as they called the procedures after reporting. They referred to the visits of the specialist-team of veterinarians and governmental officials that investigate the seriousness of the report. In order to prevent eventual spread of the NAD, these officials park their cars outside the premises, and walk to the farm wearing white protective suites and carrying red suitcases with tests and instruments. In the densely populated agricultural areas in The Netherlands, where you can sometimes easily spot at least half a dozen farm houses in the flat scenery, this means that the village knows about a possible suspect situation within no time.
Individual farmers accused each other of giving the company interest priority over sector interest. "When farmers suspect animal diseases, they just quickly sell their suspect animals to the slaughter house and wait at least a few days before reporting, so that they can effectuate important deliveries before a possible isolation of the farm." During group discussions, several individual farmers also admitted that they sold clinically suspect animals to the slaughter house, but not to other farmers. In sum, fear of destruction of personal image and being looked upon as a criminal, and fear of deteriorating social networks were among other reasons for not reporting possible early cases of a NAD.
Theme 3. Negative Opinion on Control Measures
Farmers held the opinion that the control measures applied by government officials in The
Netherlands are long and tedious. After notification, in some cases farms may be isolated in the case animals are sampled to exclude a NAD until test results are announced. This normally takes less than 48 hours. However, in some occasions it may last longer, and the majority of farmers who had not had any experience with reporting NADs seemed all to know these exceptions from hearsay, and they were surprised to hear that in most cases isolation of the farm does not last very long.
Dutch farmers do not receive compensation for losses suffered during this period of examination after the notification, although farmers said that the financial "reward" of notifying NADs as quickly as possible is that the financial compensation for further consequences in case there is indeed a NAD, such as eradication, may be higher: healthy animals are fully compensated, sick animals are compensated for 50% and dead animals are not compensated.
Theme 4. Dissatisfaction with Post-Notification Procedures
Several farmers who had had experiences with notifying the authorities about clinically suspect situations were not satisfied with post-notification procedures. After notification, a team of three veterinarians visits the farm. These include the veterinary practitioner of the farmer, a veterinarian of the Animal Health Service, and a State veterinarian. In some instances in the past, governmental veterinarians had made a bad impression by showing lack of branch-specific knowledge when visiting a pig farm. In addition, farmers were dissatisfied if officials had displayed "detached and arrogant attitudes", and spend most of the time writing instead of personally talking to the farmers. Although in many cases farmers praised the professionalism and attitude of the specialist team, in some cases specialists were perceived by farmers as people with limited knowledge on animal disease control. These experiences had de-motivating rather than a stimulating effect on farmers to report a next possible case of a NAD.
Theme 5. Lack of Trust in Government Bodies
Farmers not only know the governmental veterinarians from notification procedures, but also from other contacts, such as commodity inspections and eradication campaigns. Most officials currently are aware of the sensitive nature of the procedure after reporting, and are especially trained to deal with farmers' uncertainties and emotions while performing their duties. Their attitudes during commodity inspections, however, may be totally different, which relates to the different role they are fulfilling during these activities. Farmers do sometimes not discriminate between these roles, and know governmental officials only in their corrective role of commodity inspectors.
In addition, the results indicate that farmers have concerns about earlier animal disease interventions by government bodies. Farmers felt that during past NAD eradication campaigns, they were pushed aside and they were not in control of their business anymore.
Moreover, common to all the farmers was the belief that disease prevention measures launched by government authorities were not consistent and hence not fair. They felt that the government was often giving priority to trade and economic interests. A pig farmer made it clear by saying: "pig farms were the first to close down during an outbreak of FMD in the dairy sector, while dairy farms were allowed to sell their milk." Likewise, dairy farmers complained that pig farmers are allowed to continue long distance international transports, whilst they believe these transports are the major cause of infection. Overall, many farmers currently have a lack of trust in government officials and as a result find it difficult to accept Published in Veterinary Microbiology 2010; 142: 108-118 .
12
that government could or would work together with farmers to control NADs. This will be a challenge for both the government and farmers.
Theme 6. Uncertainty and Lack of Transparency of Notification Procedures
Farmers lacked insight into reporting procedures and, perhaps more importantly, the process that would follow after a notification. The uncertainty about how long the farm might be closed, already mentioned under Theme 3, is but one example of the uncertainty about possible consequences of a notification. Tension caused by uncertainty starts with the fear of the actual result. Farmers hope for negative test results, but once they have notified the authorities, they often expect that the test results will be positive. Farmers expressed the need for a web-site that you could regularly visit to check the progress of the notification, or a phone number that you could call. Uncertainty also reflects in complaints about the specific steps in the notification procedure, such as making the first telephone call to the veterinary authorities. In all cases the farmers felt that the person answering the calls needed to be an expert with whom they could discuss the seriousness of their report. However, in practice the person answering the phone is an administrator and not an animal disease expert.
Transparency and confidence in the information that is presented are prerequisites for controlling animal disease outbreaks. Currently, farmers were hesitant in using formal channels because they felt that these sources of information were not up to date or reliable. As one pig farmer put it: "you can find more information through informal channels than through formal ones".
Questionnaire
A total of 75 pig farmers and 334 veterinary practitioners responded to the electronic questionnaire. The quantitative study covered topics related to Themes 1 to 6 of the If a pig farmer is familiar with the clinical signs of CSF, he is in the best position to detect this disease, because he is on the frontline of animal disease identification and responsible for biosecurity measures. Our qualitative findings demonstrated that biosecurity behavior (practices employed on farms to prevent and/or control disease) are influenced by levels of awareness or knowledge about biosecurity, which is in line with previous research (Delabbio et al., 2003 (Delabbio et al., , 2004 (Delabbio et al., , 2005 Lawson et al., 2001; Heffernan et al., 2008) . Farmers' knowledge and awareness of the disease and their willingness to report the disease, was called vigilance towards disease by Hopp et al. (2007) . A recent study by Elbers et al. (2007) revealed that Dutch pig farmers have a rather limited knowledge on clinical signs of CSF:
33% of pig farmers could mention maximally three clinical signs associated with CSF (all of them late in the disease process) and 7% of pig farmers was not able to mention one single clinical sign of CSF and said they were entirely dependent on the veterinary practitioners' ability to judge a clinically suspect situation. The results of the present study also support the impression that a considerable proportion of pig farmers put the responsibility for judging a clinically suspect situation completely in the hands of their practitioner. It should be noted that in the course of the decision process to report a clinically suspect situation, the pig farmer is still the first person to recognize that something is wrong with his pigs and that he is in need of the judgment of his practitioner. As mentioned during the focus-group meetings, pig farmers in the Netherlands have the authority to treat their animals with antibiotics out of a stockpile (four weeks worth of treatment) obtained from their veterinary practitioner.
Therefore, there is a risk that pigs with early clinical signs of CSF are treated first (with antibiotics) for several days, and when the treatment does not have the desired effect, finally a practitioner is consulted for his judgment. The results of our present study indicate that both farmers and veterinary practitioners would report a clinically suspect situation much quicker, if clinical signs of CSF would be more specific. However, the lack of specificity of clinical signs of CSF to detect an outbreak, especially in the early stage of the disease process, is an important barrier for early detection. It is without discussion that if there are disease-specific clinical signs or other not-tomiss signs like progressive and exponential mortality, there should be immediate reporting to the veterinary authorities. However, in practice these black-and-white situations do not often occur. In-between the black-and-white situations that clearly there is -or there is no -clinical indication for a suspicion of a NAD, there is a large grey area where a farmer and veterinary practitioner can not totally rule-out a notifiable disease solely on the basis of a clinical inspection. And this will be more the case if you are looking at the beginning of the disease process, when non-specific signs will gradually show in a few animals. The possibility to submit samples from selected animals of pig farms by veterinary practitioners to a reference laboratory in the case of non-specific clinical signs, to rule-out disease caused by a CSF, without involvement of the authorities and without isolation of the farm, might be a solution to increase the probability of early detection (Elbers et al., 2007) . The alternative is that farmers will wait for several days, use medication for an extended period of time to solve the increasing problem, until one realizes too late that one is hit by a catastrophe because the clinical problems have accumulated exponentially. This tool is in operation in the Netherlands, and was started when there was a direct threat due to CSF-outbreaks in Germany Important requirements to achieve that goal are: a credible communicator, a high level of similarity between the audience (farmers) and the communicator, and finally the message and the communicator must be perceived as trustworthy (Heffernan et al., 2008) . Since government bodies are not perceived as highly credible and/or trustworthy by livestock farmers (Bennet and Cooke, 2005; Hood and Seedsman, 2004; Poortinga ety al., 2004; van Haaften et al., 2004) ), there is a specific need for a figurehead arising from the pig industry to take on that challenge.
It appears that the relationship between farmer and practitioner plays a role in the willingness to report a suspect situation, and that there is also an area of tension between farmer and vet if it comes to reporting (retrospectively) a false alarm: "do I (farmer) trust the competence of my vet?" and "Am I (vet) loosing a client (farmer) if my reporting is a false alarm?" Our present study indicates that vets have a much more negative image of the consequences of a false alarm for the relationship between farmer and vet than the farmer has.
This would call for recalibration of the relationship between vets and farmers by the vets.
RECOMMENDATIONS
From our present study, the following recommendations are made to facilitate early detection of CSF: a) development of a clinical decision support system for veterinary practitioners and farmers, in order to get faster diagnosis and detection of CSF; b) possibility to submit blood samples directly to the reference laboratory to exclude CSF in a clinical situation with nonspecific clinical signs, without isolation of the farm and completely free of charge for the individual farmer (group interest paid by communal funds); c) decrease social and economic consequences of reporting CSF, for example by improving the public opinion on first reports; d) better training of governmental employees to deal with emotions and insecurity of farmers in the process after reporting; e) better communication of rules and regulations, where to There is a large grey area, e.g. increased mortality combined with non-specific clinical signs. There are several (non-defined) factors playing a role in the decision process to report a suspicious situation. Even with very high mortality, some farmers do not think there is a real problem. Related problem: farmers applying medication (no supervision and correction by veterinary practitioner)
You make your own risk assessment of the probability that the clinical problems on your farm are caused by CSF, and you do not call in a second opinion in order to prevent negative (financial) consequences
Characteristics of disease
The higher the probability of infection, the faster one would report. When there are no outbreaks in neighboring countries, the probability of infection is estimated to be low
There is a high probability that clinical problems are not caused by CSF and therefore it is difficult to report such a situation. You want to prevent raising a false alarm. If you are very sure it is CSF, you want to report as soon as possible
Negative consequences
Both for farmers as for veterinary practitioners. They are both vulnerable due to specialization. When there is a real outbreak, limitation of movement or stamping-out policy applied in neighborhood may lead to the question of guilt
Especially the social consequences are high when a false alarm is raised (strangers on the premises). Farmers are not willing to spend money on medical treatment of their animals and supervision, especially if it concerns the protection of the interests of the pig industry as a whole when they think it is not in their own personal interest Consequences will play a role on the background. It is felt as very negative that others (authorities) take over the farm during an investigation of a suspicion, you are not your own master anymore on your own farm 4. Guilt, shame and prejudice Farmers having a CSF outbreak are perceived as being non-hygienic, and have illegal businesses
Farmers do not want to have strangers with unfamiliar cars on their premises to be seen by the neighbors or have the major of the town visiting them in the evening for a serious talk
The farmer that is reporting should be treated as a hero, he takes responsibility for the pig industry as a whole. In practice he is looked upon as a criminal
Earlier experience with reporting
Association between earlier negative experiences and tendency to not to report too quickly 
Feelings and (economic) consequences one expected after reporting a clinical suspicion
Reporting a suspicion, when retrospectively this was a false alarm, has a (very) negative financial consequence for the farm 40 49 n.s # .
Reporting a false alarm, would have a (very) negative influence on the relationship between farmer and vet 5 23 < 0.001
Reporting a suspect situation, when retrospectively this was really caused by CSF, would have a (very) negative influence on the relationship between farmer and vet 3 7 n.s.
Barriers for reporting
I trust that all pig farmers will do their utmost to prevent an outbreak of CSF in the pig sector 45 43 n.s.
The obligation by law to report a clinically suspect situation is the most import reason for reporting 40 39 n.s.
The fuss linked to reporting a suspect situation is often a reason for not reporting 29 31 n.s.
The difference in compensation between sick and dead animals is a good stimulus to report 56 44 0.06
The threat of possibly paying a penalty for negligence is perceived as an important reason to report a suspicious clinical situation 45 31 0.02
It is more terrible to report a suspicion, when retrospectively this was a false alarm, than to have missed a real case of CSF n.s. n.s.
There is a need for more information (website: photos, video) on CSF characteristics (clinical signs, transmission routes etc.).
